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The Sleep of Reason
SUZANNA SHERRY*
INTRODUCTION
A very strange thing is happening in legal academia. The left and the right
have joined forces, and the center is under attack. What makes this so unusual is
that law has traditionally been a field of centrists. The common law background,
drummed into every first year law student, tends to leave lawyers with a taste
for incremental rather than sudden change.' Further experience with the doc-
trine of stare decisis and the methods of legal reasoning only strengthens this
tendency. Even those students who come in eager to change the world rarely
survive more than a few years in practice before realizing the futility of hoping
for radical decisions from judges who have spent a lifetime internalizing the
careful and methodical pace of the common law. Some adjust; others go into
politics, which may offer more hope of radical transformations. Apparently,
however, the most unrepentant idealists have been gravitating toward academia,
where they are now attacking legal centrism at its source.
This joinder of left and right against the center can be seen in a variety of
contexts. Many radical feminists have made common cause with the "Moral
Majority" in seeking to suppress pornography. 2 Proponents of hate speech
regulations take a view of academic freedom that would not have been unfamil-
iar to Joseph McCarthy. 3 Several prominent progressive legal academics have
adopted the tactics of Robert Bork by portraying their own political agendas as
the intent of the Framers. 4 Traditional notions of affirmative action-that mem-
bers of certain groups ought to be given the benefit of the doubt in close
* Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of Minnesota. The
title of this article is taken from a sketch by Goya, The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters. It is one of
a series of sketches constituting "scathing assaults upon the ignorance and greed of the priesthood and
the corruptness of the civic institutions." ALBERT F. CALVERT, GOYA: AN ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE AND
WORKS 92 (1908). The work depicts phantasmagoric bats and owls circling a sleeping man and placing
a pencil in his hand, and is interpreted by one scholar as follows: "There Goya, as author, transmitter
and critic of that which would be disclosed in the subsequent scenes, is seen surrendering to a sleep in
which semblances possible only in Reason's absence are allowed to form." PRISCILLA E. MULLER,
GOYA'S "BLACK" PAINTINGS: TRUTH AND REASON IN LIGHT AND LIBERTY 86-87 (1984). I would like to
thank Susan Bandes, Jim Chen, Paul Edelman, Dan Farber, John Garvey, and Sandy Levinson for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, and Kaitlin Hallett for her excellent research
assistance.
1. See Paul D. Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 691, 740-41 (1995).
2. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993).
3. See, e.g., MAI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993) [hereinafter WORDS THAT WOUND].
4. Compare BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991) with Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberal-
ism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918 (1992); compare ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1994) with Suzanna Sherry, Progressive Regression,
47 STAN. L. REV. 1097 (1995); compare MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS (1994) with
Suzanna Sherry, An Originalist Understanding of Minimalism, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 175 (1993).
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cases-are opposed not only by conservatives trumpeting the value of color-
blindness, but also by some critical race theorists who argue that affirmative
action as currently practiced serves only to legitimize illegitimate credentials
and to perpetuate stereotypes of inferiority.5 But perhaps the oddest coupling of
all is the attack on the whole Enlightenment tradition by both radical social
constructivists on the left and conservative religionists on the right.
We all know the Enlightenment story, but this article recounts-and criticizes-
the rather surprising ending that is currently in vogue. Once upon a time, reason
replaced faith as the guiding epistemology. In response, religion became largely
rational itself, questioning the sharp distinction between faith and reason.6
Despite occasional upsurges, religiosity of the traditional, pre-Enlightenment,
antirational kind gradually diminished in the Western world. Originally pure
and acontextual, reason eventually came to encompass pragmatism or practical
reason. 7 For good or ill, the reason and empiricism of the Enlightenment-
modified and expanded by later thinkers-reigned supreme. Occasional critics
were discounted as primitive, naive, or uneducated, and rarely gained a foothold
in universities.8
The first ripple in this once uncontroversial ending came from French postmod-
ernists, whose ideas were quickly adopted in the 1980s by legal academics on
the left. Critical legal scholars, radical feminists, critical race theorists, and gay
and lesbian theorists 9 began to attribute the Enlightenment epistemology to
powerful straight white men, to suggest that others might have different and
equally valid epistemologies, and to argue for a sort of epistemological plural-
ism. This approach has more recently been adopted by conservative scholars
arguing that we ought to afford religion a more central place in our politics and
culture. Enlightenment reason, they suggest, is just one of a number of alterna-
tive epistemologies, and there is no justification for privileging it over religious
ways of knowing such as faith and revelation.
Nor is this all merely abstract philosophical speculation: both the radicals and
5. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or Do You Really Want
to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1222 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado, Role Model]; Richard
Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711, 1746 (1995)
[hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth]; Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative
Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705.
6. See, e.g., JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN AMERICA
(1985).
7. On the differences between practical reason and the more radical social constructivism, see infra
Part IV. Practical reason, or at least an experiential or empirical component of reason, was likely part of
the Enlightenment project from the beginning. See, e.g., Louise M. Antony, Quine As Feminist: The
Radical Import of Naturalized Epistemology, in A MIND OF ONE'S OWN: FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON
AND OBJEcrvrry 185, 196 (Louise M. Antony & Charlotte Witt eds., 1993) ("It was no part of
Descartes's project (much less Kant's) to assert the self-sufficiency of reason.").
8. Marxism, which did gain a foothold in American universities, generally adhered to the canons of
scientific rationality. Marxist attacks on the Enlightenment did not tend to question Enlightenment
epistemology but only argued that the prevailing understanding of reality was incorrect and the result of
false consciousness.
9. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607, 635 & n.141 (1994).
[Vol. 84:453
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the religionists use their critique of the Enlightenment to advocate very real
legal change. Questions of epistemology are thus made central to issues of
public policy, and the question becomes what sort of epistemology we should
use in governance. After first describing the surprising congruence between the
left and the right, I will suggest in this article that our history, the basic structure
of our government, and serious practical considerations all point to Enlighten-
ment epistemology as the one best suited for public governance.
I. REASON
Before turning to the attacks on Enlightenment reason, I should briefly
explain what I mean by the term. First, I mean to include pragmatism, or
practical reason, within the definition: pure ratiocination is not the only form
that reasoning can take. Practical reason, originally derived from Aristotle and
currently enjoying a resurgence in American legal thought, involves not algo-
rithms but judgment. Pragmatists rely on a congeries of sources for their
judgments, including experience, observation, logic, learned patterns, and tradi-
tion. Thus, although reason generally refers to a cognitive process whose
persuasiveness depends on consistency with the ordinary canons of the scien-
tific method, a conclusion need not be shatterproof to be warranted.
I specifically do not mean to limit reason to a narrowly defined method of
thought such as deductive logic or the scientific method. Thus, reason can
incorporate what Anthony Kronman, following Alexander Bickel, calls "pru-
dence."' What distinguishes reason from alternative epistemologies is its
general reliance on basic logic and the evidence of the senses (augmented by
scientific discoveries). Certain types of questions are always in order in re-
sponse to a reasoned argument: "Doesn't that contradict what you said ear-
lier?"; "Is that consistent with the evidence?"; and "If that's true, wouldn't it
follow that ... ?" Other responses are always out of order: "This must be true
(or false) because the ultimate source of authority (God, the Bible, or some
other source) says so"; and "I have faith that this is true regardless of its
internal contradictions or its inconsistency with the evidence."
In some ways, it is easier to describe what reason is by explaining what it is
not. To be reasonable, an argument need not depend solely on deductive
reasoning, but it cannot be illogical. It need not be entirely provable by
scientific experiment, but it cannot be inconsistent with everything science and
the social sciences know about reality-until and unless that reality is experimen-
tally proven wrong. 1' Reasoned appeals need not be fully successful, but if they
10. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 21
(1993); Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1569-73
(1985). Kronman draws a distinction between "prudence" and "rationalist spirit," id. at 1605-07, but I
do not mean to place reason solely on what he describes as the rationalist side of this distinction. The
life of the law is not logic, but reason and logic are not equivalent.
11. This point is consistent with THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(1962). For all that it has been misused by legal scholars, Kuhn's book can be taken to make the point
19961
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convince no one except those who are already believers, they are probably
flawed. Nor are common human emotions entirely excluded. 12 But neither
appeals to power nor "strategic arguments designed to persuade [primarily] by
their emotional effect on the listener" are consistent with reasoned argument.13
Reason also stands on its own: neither the identity of the speaker nor her
institutional role should be relevant to the persuasiveness of an argument.
Moreover, reasoned argument invites response and must therefore depend on
a commonly shared perception of reality. Appeals to a perception of reality
shared only by the faithful-those who have seen the light, as it were-cannot
count as reasonable. Thus, both the popular slogan that "it's a Black thing, you
wouldn't understand," and the Calvinist tenet that if one has not received the
grace of God one cannot know truth, are concessions that reasoned argument
has been abandoned. Attempts at conversion can count as reasoned argument,
but only if they do not depend primarily on emotional manipulation. Thus, for
me to persuade an unrepentant male chauvinist that gender equality is a good
thing, I cannot appeal solely to his love for his mother, wife, and daughter, but I
can make arguments about fairness and about consequences. 14 The former
appeals may or may not be successful, but they do not count as reasoned
arguments.
The lasting accomplishment of the Enlightenment, then, was its development
of an epistemological method. That method was a repudiation of "the millen-
nium of superstition, other-worldliness, mysticism, and dogma known as the
Middle, or Dark, Ages."' 5 Personal revelation and institutional power were no
longer valid sources of authority. Instead, the human capacity to reason, in all
its splendor, would control the future. As Justice Felix Frankfurter commented
in a related context, "[w]hat mattered was excellence in your profession to
which your father or your face was equally irrelevant."' 16 It is this vision of
that a paradigm shift cannot occur until there is enough evidence to make the shift credible under the
ordinary canons of reason and science.
12. The line between reason and emotion may be fuzzy in any case. See Susan Bandes, Empathy,
Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996). But as Anthony
Kronman points out, reason is necessary to distinguish good emotions from bad ones: "Reason is in
command, stories contribute no independent moral insight of their own, and the most that they can
do-an essential but limited function-is to energize the convictions of right reason, which come from
outside their domain." Anthony T. Kronman, Leontius' Tale, in LAW'S STORIES (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., forthcoming 1996).
13. The quotation is from Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86
MICH. L. REv. 1835, 1846 (1988), discussing legal scholarship.
14. For further examples of the differences between reasoned and unreasoned argument, see infra
text accompanying notes 124-28.
15. RALPH KETCHAM, FRAMED FOR POSTERITY: THE ENDURING PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION 21
(1993).
16. Quoted in G. Edward White, Felix Frankfurter, the Old Boy Network, and the New Deal: The
Placement of Elite Lawyers in Public Service in the 1930s, in INTERVENTION AND DETACHMENT: ESSAYS
IN LEGAL HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 149, 154 (1994). Frankfurter was commenting on the Harvard
Law School of his youth; the modem university arose to develop and exploit the human capacity for
reasoned understanding. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: "A Special Concern of the First
Amendment, " 99 YALE L.J. 251, 269-72 (1989).
[Vol. 84:453
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reason-independent of all other claims of authority, human or divine-as
superior to other epistemological forms that is currently under attack.
II. THE CRITIQUE OF (IMPURE) REASON
A common thread in the recent attacks on the Enlightenment is that reason
does not exist apart from its social and political hegemony. In other words, these
critical and religious scholars claim that the Enlightenment was a fraud: it
merely replaced one socially constructed view of reality with another, mistaking
power for knowledge. As one critic puts it, "[t]he term 'reasonable' .. . serves
the same performative function in Rawls's theory as that served by the term
'God' in dogmatic religious argument." 17 Once we have exposed reason as just
another social construction, the argument goes, we can no longer privilege this
one perception of reality and label others as inferior or deviant.
Social constructivism's core refusal to privilege the Enlightenment epistemol-
ogy has penetrated many disciplines. For example, psychiatry professor Paul
McHugh tells of a typical student reaction to his own characterization of a
patient as delusional and schizophrenic:
[The patient] stated that she was frightened because one of the NASA
satellites had been preempted by the Freemasons to record her every move-
ment. She believed that the satellite had been equipped to beam down an
invisible, but powerful ray, forcing upon her blasphemous thoughts....
With such a set of symptoms I felt safe in saying that she had an incapacitat-
ing mental disorder such as schizophrenia.... I noted that she was not
afflicted by NASA or the Masons but by a delusion-an idiosyncratic, incorri-
gible, preoccupying false belief....
A student shot up his hand. With disdain, he said, "That poor woman's
beliefs would only be called false if you took a narrow view of them. You
should consider them within her life of poverty, chaos, and neglect. Then you
would see them differently. She developed thoughts about NASA and the
Masons to make sense out of a frightening and perplexing world." 18
This medical student's refusal to distinguish between the sane and the insane
has an impeccable social constructivist pedigree. Michel Foucault, from whom
many postmodernists in the American legal academy draw their inspiration, has
criticized the very distinction between sanity and insanity as merely the way in
which the self-declared "reasonable" subjugate alternative epistemologies.' 9
The characterization of insanity, which we normally label deviant, as a valid
alternative epistemology also has implications for religious epistemologies.
John Garvey has compared religion with insanity, noting that "religious claim-
ants ... have a different understanding of reality than the one on which society
17. Paul F. Campos, Secular Fundamentalism, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1814, 1817 (1994).
18. Paul R. McHugh, What's The Story?, 64 AM. SCHOLAR 191, 192 (1995).
19. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF
REASON at ix-x (Richard Howard trans., 1965).
19961 457
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is built."' 20 To the extent that Garvey's characterization is accurate, social
constructivism frees religious beliefs, no less than other perceptions of reality,
from the marginal or deviant place to which the Enlightenment's hegemony has
condemned them. Foucault himself may have recognized how his philosophy
validated religious epistemologies. 21 Indeed, many critical and religious schol-
ars now rely heavily on social constructivism to expose the weak foundations of
the Enlightenment and to support the case for epistemological pluralism.
The heart of radical social constructivism is its denial that human knowledge
is based on transcendent reality. The currently popular form of this denial is to
suggest that claims of knowledge cannot be evaluated apart from the social
roles-and, in particular, the race and gender-of those who claim to know. 22
The radical project is to expose "scientific rationality" as just one among many
ways of knowing 23 and to demonstrate that intellectual authority derives solely
from institutional authority.24 The Enlightenment claim of reason as the univer-
sal solvent is therefore dismissed as merely mistaking a particular white male
epistemology for a general truth. For example, Deborah Rhode notes that
"knowledge is socially constructed rather than objectively determined." 25 Catha-
rine MacKinnon rejects objectivity and scientific norms as "a specifically male
approach to knowledge.", 26 Richard Delgado rejects the primacy of "linear,
rationalistic thought.", 27 William Eskridge suggests that "truth is merely a
20. John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779, 796
(1986); see also Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 841, 842 (1992) ("Religious issues are so intractable because different people have
fundamentally different perceptions of reality."). Garvey was not equating religion and insanity, but
rather suggesting why religious believers might deserve special treatment by society. Nonetheless, his
insight (and Laycock's) is useful in highlighting the fact that many religious epistemologies differ from
the dominant secular epistemology of the Enlightenment.
21. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE: INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS
1977-1984, at 215 (Lawrence D. Kritzman ed., 1988) ("saluting" the Iranian revolution of the late
1970s).
22. Earlier Marxist attacks on knowledge as class-based also exist, but I will focus here primarily on
race- and gender-based social constructivism.
23. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 976, 1028-44
(1991); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of
Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 893-94 (1989); Mar J. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 359 (1987).
24. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1342-43 (1984).
25. Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1547, 1555 (1993) (footnote omitted).
26. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 54 (1987);
see also GENEVIEVE LLOYD, THE MAN OF REASON: "MALE" AND "FEMALE" IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
(1984) (arguing that reason is male); Patricia Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IOWA L. REV. 19, 27
(1991); Finley, supra note 23, at 893-94 (calling legal reasoning and language male); Linda R.
Hirshman, Foreword: The Waning of the Middle Ages, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293, 297-98 (1993)
(arguing that in legal teaching, liberal concepts of free expression are often used to hide medieval
orthodoxy about what counts as knowledge). Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758,
806-07 (claiming that knowledge is necessarily a social construct).
27. Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth, supra note 5, at 1721 (describing such thought as "what the victors
impose").
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language game that people play,"'2 8 and Charles Lawrence explores that lan-
guage game and explains how "racist speech constructs the social reality that
constrains the liberty of nonwhites because of their race.", 29 John Calmore
writes that "[c]ultural bias sets standards for performance in terms of the
tendencies, skills, or attributes of white America.", 30 Alex Johnson describes
"the reality that the Euro-American male's perspective is the background norm
or heuristic governing in the normal evaluative context." 3' Postmodernist legal
scholars also believe that their attacks have been fatal to the Enlightenment
project: many radical intellectuals are convinced that social constructivism and
other postmodern philosophies have so undermined the ideas of the Enlighten-
ment that reason has been successfully "displaced by an emphasis on the
socially contingent and power-driven nature of conceptions of reality and the
ubiquity of often incommensurable perspectives."
32
With reason exposed as only the preferred methodology of a particular class
and time, radical constructivists turn instead to the narrative and emotional
functions of language.33 Anecdotal evidence replaces scientific data, and telling
stories becomes the equivalent of making rational arguments.3 4 Thus, what
people say becomes as important as what they can "prove," and the persuasive-
ness of any given claim rests as much on its noncognitive or emotional appeal
as on whether it accords with the dictates of reason and common knowledge.
Once the commonality of reason is rejected, knowledge is intensely personal,
28. Eskridge, supra note 9, at 623.
29. Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, in
WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 3, at 53, 62; see also Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of
Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in
Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803, 819 (1994) (arguing that "society largely constructs social
reality and... matters of race affect this construction").
30. John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic
Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2219 (1992).
3 1. Johnson, supra note 29, at 833-34. These quotations are meant to be representative rather than
exhaustive. For overviews of the radical constructivist stance, see, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 9; Daniel
A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?, 83 CAL. L. REv. 853
(1995); Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO. L.J. 313 (1992); Susan H.
Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 63 (1993).
32. Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L. REv. 2061, 2076
(1992) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)); see also Vivian Grosswald Curran, Deconstruction, Structuralism, Antisemit-
ism and the Law, 36 B.C. L. REv. 1, 48 (1994) ("The twentieth century signalled the end of the
Enlightenment belief in progress towards a perfectible, rational civilization.").
33. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Legal Storytelling and Constitutional Law:
The Medium and the Message, in LAW'S STORIES, supra note 12.
34. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (providing overview and evaluation of legal storytell-
ing); Johnson, supra note 29 (defending narratives in legal scholarship); see also PAUL R. GROSS &
NORMAN LEVITr, HIGHER SUPERSTITION: THE ACADEMIC LEFr AND ITS QUARRELS WITH SCIENCE 72
(1994) ("There is no knowledge, then; there are merely stories, 'narratives,' devised to satisfy the
human need to make some sense of the world. ... On this view, all knowledge projects are, like war,
politics by other means.").
1996] 459
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communicable only through what many radicals label "transformation.", 35
An identical criticism of Enlightenment rationality runs through the legal
literature on religion. The new defenders of religion view faith as an alternative
to Enlightenment rationality, and, like the radicals, contend that the epistemol-
ogy of reason and empiricism is socially contingent rather than universal or
superior.36 Stephen Carter sympathetically describes the religious view of mod-
em science:
[T]he creationist parent will never be convinced that the war is between his or
her religious belief on the one hand and scientific fact on the other. Rather, the
war is between competing systems of discerning truth-and creationist par-
ents, much like [scientists opposing the teaching of creationism], want to
know why it is that the school has the right to teach their children lies.37
Frederick Gedicks notes that Enlightenment reason and empiricism are under
sustained attack and agrees with the radicals that it was "built on a weak
intellectual foundation." ' 38 Michael McConnell describes religious schools as
"exemplars of an alternative understanding of knowledge., 39 Gedicks and
Michael Perry both use the language of social constructivism to condemn the
privileging of reason over faith: Gedicks describes it as "the exercise of
contingent social power,",40 and Perry warns us that "[n]o privileged standpoint
exists from which to adjudicate among competing conceptions of rationality.",4 1
35. See, e.g., Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. REV.
683, 715 (1992); Jerome McCristal Cuip, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching:
Finding the Me in the LegalAcademy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539, 543 (1991); Matsuda, supra note 23, at 335;
Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1, 2 (1990); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the "Agon" Between Legal
Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2225, 2228 (1989).
36. An alternative schema opposes religion and postmodernism, viewing both liberal and postmodem-
ist views as corrosive of the transcendent, objective truths of faith. See Nomi M. Stolzenberg, "He
Drew A Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal
Education, 106 HARv. L. REV. 581, 611 (1993) (noting that fundamentalist Christian parents who seek
alternative education for their children view public schools' "cultivation of individual reason, objective
judgment and rational, critical thought.., as a form of indoctrination"). Indeed, the traditional view of
most religious believers is that they do possess objective truth applicable to all. The academic defenders
of broad religious freedom do not tend to take that approach, conceding, as they must, that government
cannot simply accept the "truth" of religious beliefs. Thus, they argue instead that secular beliefs, no
less than religious beliefs, are socially constructed.
37. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE
RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 176 (1993).
38. Frederick M. Gedicks, The Religious, the Secular and the Antithetical, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 113,
126 (1991) [hereinafter Gedicks, Religious and Secular]; see also Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life
and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 680 (1992) [hereinafter Gedicks, Hostility] (arguing that
postmodernism has "fatally undermined" epistemological premises of Enlightenment).
39. Michael W. McConnell, Academic Freedom in Religious Colleges and Universities, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 303, 312.
40. Gedicks, Hostility, supra note 38, at 681; see also id. at 686 ("The allocation of creationism to
the marginalized world of subjectivity, and evolution to the privileged world of objectivity, is merely
the exercise of social power rather than a natural, value-neutral distinction.").
41. Michael J. Perry, Comment on "The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Convic-
[Vol. 84:453
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The similarities between the radicals and the religionists are striking. Com-
pare Richard Delgado, a prominent critical race theorist, with Gedicks: Delgado
asserts that "[merit] criteria ... sound suspiciously like a description of me and
the place where I stand.",42 Gedicks argues, in denying that evolution fits the
empirical data better than creationism, " '[b]etter' simply means 'preferable' or
'more congenial,' as in 'my paradigm is better than yours.' ,43 Jeffrey Stout,
defending Thomist epistemology as a viable alternative to Enlightenment rea-
son, notes that "we lack ... a good reason for preferrihg one conceptual
scheme, with its standards of judgment, to another." 44 This sounds very much
like Duncan Kennedy: "There are no meta-criteria of merit that determine
which among culturally and ideologically specific research traditions or schol-
arly paradigms is 'better' or 'truer.' ,45 Radical feminist Lucinda Finley con-
demns as inherently male "[r]ationality, abstraction, [and] a preference for
statistical and empirical proofs, ' ' 4 6 while one sympathetic observer describes
the dispute between fundamentalist parents and traditional school boards as a
"disagreement... over whether to consider the cultivation of individual reason,
objective judgment and rational, critical thought ... as a form of indoctrina-
tion.",4 7 Michael Perry cautions us to be "skeptical of the distinction between
nonrational judgments and rational ones,",48 and Jane Baron-one of the defend-
ers of the new storytelling movement-questions the distinction between "rea-
son and analysis" and "emotive appeal."' 49 Linda Hirshman's criticism of John
Rawls-that he ignores feminist criticism of the rationalist and individualist
epistemology of the liberal Enlightenment 5°-echoes the criticism of religious
defenders Gary Leedes and David Smolin, who argue that Rawls ignores
religious worldviews incompatible with liberalism and rationality. 51 William
tions: Protecting Animals and the Environment, " 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1067, 1067-68 (1986); see
also id. at 1068 ("The liberal attempt to disqualify religious judgments or beliefs is an attempt to
privilege a particular conception or range of conceptions of rationality, and thus liberalism is not at all
as 'neutral' or 'impartial' as it aspires and advertises itself to be.").
42. Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Cause, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1, 9
(1991).
43. Gedicks, Hostility, supra note 38, at 685-86.
44. JEFFREY STOUT, THE FLIGHT FROM AUTHORITY: RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE QUEST FOR
AUTONOMY 11 (1981).
45. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 733.
46. Finley, supra note 23, at 893.
47. Stolzenberg, supra note 36, at 611.
48. Perry, supra note 41, at 1067.
49. Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 277-85 (1994); see also Mari J.
Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, I I WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 7, 8 (1989); Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. 37, 47-48 (1988).
50. See Linda R. Hirshman, Is the Original Position Inherently Male-Superior?, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1860 (1994); see also Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human
Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls'Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613 (1986).
51. See Gary C. Leedes, Rawls's Excessively Secular Political Conception, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 1083
(1993); David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A
Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (1991).
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Eskridge describes the human mind as inevitably tending to "create exploitive
power arrangements" by "reflexively organiz[ing] the world through 'dividing
practices' and 'scientific classifications' " that "arbitrarily demarcate winners
and losers.", 52 Gedicks makes a similar point: "The allocation of creationism to
the marginalized world of subjectivity, and evolution to the privileged world of
objectivity, is merely the exercise of social power rather than a natural, value-
neutral distinction." 5
3
Whether or not they use the language of social constructivism, the new
religion scholars are necessarily aligned with the radicals by virtue of their
attack on the rationality of the Enlightenment. Carter and McConnell, for
example, tend to defend faith as a valid alternative to reason without directly
suggesting that reality is socially constructed.54 Others, like Douglas Laycock,
implicitly argue for pluralism without actually discussing epistemological is-
sues: Laycock would allow those with nonrational religious beliefs-such as the
belief that one will be eternally damned if one works on the Sabbath-to avoid
obligations that are imposed. on the rest of us. 55 Because he presumably would
not grant the same privilege to flat-earthers, racists, or the insane, Laycock
necessarily accords the epistemology of faith as much respect as the epistemol-
ogy of reason. But if religious faith is a valid alternative epistemology, then why
not the different ways of knowing attributed to women and people of color?
Moreover, both the feminine voice and the voice of color are, like faith,
described as antirational. 56 Just as the radicals posit that knowledge is communi-
cable only (or primarily) through emotive appeal and transformation, faith too is
personal, acquired through an essentially noncognitive process. Thus, even the
more moderate religionists are implicitly accepting the claims of social construc-
tivism.
In their rejection of Enlightenment epistemology, both radicals and religion-
ists make the validity of their beliefs untestable by conventional means. The
methods of science and rational argument are of no avail in evaluating religious
beliefs: "[tlhe process by which one develops belief in a transcendent reality-
acquires faith-is not, cannot be, a rational process, for the validity of the
objects of one's faith cannot be observed or tested, nor can it be logically
proven.", 57 Nor can faith be rationally disproved, for while "incoherence,
anomaly, and paradox always count as weaknesses in a scientific theory... this
52. Eskridge, supra note 9, at 635-36.
53. Gedicks, Hostility, supra note 38, at 686.
54. See CARTER, supra note 37; McConnell, supra note 39.
55. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1 [hereinafter
Laycock, Remnants]; Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990).
56. For an overview of the literature on different ways of knowing, see Farber & Sherry, supra note
34, at 809-19.
57. Frederick M. Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts on
Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1604 (1987).
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appears not to be the case for ... traditional religious thought." 58 Thus, unlike
replicable scientific truths and rational arguments based on human observation
and experience, the validity of religious beliefs is uniquely personal, not shared
except within the community of believers. As Kent Greenawalt puts it: "The
truths that one person learns by making a leap of faith are not fully accessible to
someone who has not made a similar leap, and generally accessible reasons are
not powerful enough to induce a leap of faith.",
59
Similarly, many critical scholars tend to eschew empirical data60 in favor of
personal stories designed to create a "flash of recognition" in the reader.6'
These narratives provide an indispensable entry into "forms of knowledge that
may not be generated or validated by scientific objectivity, through which we
may nonetheless learn critical things about ourselves and our world."' 62 The
empathic reaction to personal narratives, like religious faith, cannot be induced
by the cold language of reason. As Lucinda Finley -puts it, "[tihere are some
things that just cannot be said" in the language of reason.63 And, like religious
faith, the emotional content of neither the storyteller's narrative nor the reader's
reaction can be disproved. 64 Some storytellers go so far as to deny that the
stories themselves need be factually accurate: what counts is the faith they
recount and inspire.65 Finally, the rejection of Enlightenment epistemology,
whether by social constructivists or faithful believers, "leaves no ground whatso-
58. STOUT, supra note 44, at 105; see also id. at 106:
What we might deem a 'paradox,' and therefore a weakness, traditional theology christens a
'mystery,' to be accepted on faith. So even if a given doctrine turns out to be a logical
paradox, such that its intelligibility or comprehensibility must be taken on faith, a traditional
theologian would not treat this as a potential obstacle to belief.
59. Kent Greenawalt, Grounds for Political Judgment: The Status of Personal Experience and the
Autonomy and Generality of Principles of Restraint, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 647, 649 (1993) (describing
but not endorsing this view of religion).
60. See Finley, supra note 23, at 893 (arguing that "rationality, abstraction, [and] a preference for
statistical and empirical proofs over experiential or anecdotal evidence" are inherently male).
61. Abrams, supra note 23, at 1002-03, 1023-24.
62. Id. at 1028.
63. Finley, supra note 23, at 903; see also Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2415 (1989) (arguing that stories' "graphic
qualit[ies] can stir imagination in ways in which more conventional discourse cannot"); Lynne N.
Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1577 (1987) (arguing that "more meanings
will be available to legal discourse" using language of empathy rather than rationality).
64. On the difficulties of attempting to prove or disprove the factual aspects of stories, see Farber &
Sherry, supra note 34, at 835-38.
65. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 23, at 1025 (stating that she "would not be particularly disturbed"
if a narrative purporting to be nonfiction turned out to "not track the life experiences of [its] narrator[]
in all particulars" or to be a composite); Stuart A. Clarke, Color-Blind Prophets and Bootstrap
Philosophies: Straw Men, Shell Games and Social Criticism, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 83, 91 (1991) ("It
is naive if not disingenuous to suggest that all that matters is the promotion of truth."); Johnson, supra
note 29, at 816 & n.65 ("I think it is perfectly acceptable [in legal narratives] if that which is presented
as the truth turns out not to be objectively true in the way in which that standard typically is viewed and
used.").
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ever for distinguishing reliable knowledge from superstition.", 66 Indeed, as one
advocate of increased dialogue with religious traditions has suggested, "supersti-
tion" is merely a category we use "to congratulate ourselves for being more
rational than our ancestors and neighbors."
67
Centrists have two possible responses-other than conversion-to this congru-
ence of otherwise disparate attacks. The first is a smug complacency, which
takes simultaneous attacks from both sides as an indication that one is success-
fully treading a careful and correct line through the center. The second, and, I
believe, more appropriate response is to mount a defense. Why should we
privilege secular notions of scientific rationality over alternative epistemologies
that are indifferent to, or violative of, the ordinary canons of science? The
remainder of this article attempts a partial answer to that question. In keeping
with the pragmatist strategy of constructing a multifaceted argument, I explore
in Part III a historical justification for privileging the Enlightenment and in Part
IV a more practical one.
III. THE HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION
The legal issues explored by those who advocate epistemological pluralism
are largely constitutional. The radicals address such contemporary questions as
the constitutionality of laws regulating hate speech or pornography, the appropri-
ate scope of and justifications for affirmative action, and the unconstitutionality
of various forms of race discrimination.68 The religionists focus on the proper
interpretation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment.69 While the
epistemological attack on the Enlightenment is obviously broader than the
specific constitutional issues on which the attackers focus, their epistemology
finds its concrete form in constitutional interpretation. It is beyond the scope of
this article to argue for or against specific interpretations of constitutional
provisions. Nevertheless, because both critical and religionist scholars focus on
constitutional outcomes, the soundness of their epistemological stance rests in
part on its conformity to the Constitution. Just as we would reject as wrong-
headed a political program that rested on aristocratic or monarchic assumptions,
we should ask whether the Constitution rests on any particular epistemological
66. GROSS & LEVITT, supra note 34, at 45 (describing various postmodemist movements); see
Michael W. McConnell, Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism, and Educational Choice: What Does Our
Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 123, 127-28 (equating religious
education with Afrocentric curriculum that " 'argue[s] for witchcraft and magic (African) as legitimate
alternatives to science and reason' ") (quoting Robert K. Fullinwider, Multicultural Education, 1991 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 75, 86-87).
67. JEFFREY STOUT, ETHics AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS
110-11 (1988).
68. For overviews of the radical epistemological discussions of these issues, see Farber & Sherry,
supra note 33: Farber & Sherry. supra note 31.
69. See, e.g., Gedicks, Hostility, supra note 38; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Revisionism]; Michael
W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
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base. If, as I will suggest in this Part, our Constitution is in fact a thoroughly
Enlightenment document, that counts as an argument (although not by any
means a dispositive one) against those who would answer constitutional ques-
tions by relying on alternative epistemologies.
A. OUR ENLIGHTENMENT CONSTITUTION
We cannot know what was in the minds of the delegates to the Philadelphia
Convention, the members of the First Congress, or the state ratifiers as they
contemplated what eventually became the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
We can, and do, argue over the extent to which the historical evidence suggests
one specific interpretation over another. That argument, especially when carried
on by lawyers, tends to be superficial and not particularly enlightening. 70 The
intentions, influences, and ideological currents in eighteenth-century America
were at least as complex as their modern counterparts, and sorting them into a
single "original meaning" for a broad and ambiguous clause is as implausible
as specifying "the" epistemology of the late twentieth century-if we could do
that, this article would be superfluous. Moreover, we are far enough removed
from the ideologies and concerns of the founding generation that what they saw
as consistent we may see as contradictory, and vice versa.
For those reasons and others,7 ' I do not intend to engage here in an extended
historical discussion. But even if focusing on the specific history of particular
clauses tends to be fruitless, it may be illuminating to explore the broader
epistemological context in which the Constitution was written and adopted-
especially to the extent that this history is less controversial than the history of
individual clauses or particular ideologies. While the founding generation did
not have access to the postmodern insights that have led to the radical calls for
epistemological pluralism, it did recognize religious faith as a potential alterna-
tive epistemology. As I have suggested, there are strong parallels between
religious faith and the alternative nonrational epistemologies offered by the
critical scholars. Thus, the founders' position on faith and reason is crucial to
any understanding of the underlying epistemology of the Constitution.
Any overview of the epistemology of the founding generation will inevitably
be broad and simplistic. Moreover, as historians have been demonstrating for
the last several decades, serious differences existed among the different philoso-
phies current at the time of the founding.72 But to resolve the question posed by
the epistemological challenges I am discussing, painting with a broad brush is
70. For the most recent article substantiating such a charge, see Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in
Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995). Flaherty cites earlier articles in id.
at 526-27 n.16.
71. For a general review of some of the problems with originalism, see DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 373-97 (1990).
72. For an overview of the historical landscape, see, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Intellectual Origins of
the Constitution: A Lawyers' Guide to Contemporary Historical Scholarship, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY
323 (1988); Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11 (1992).
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not inappropriate. Despite the numerous differences between Madisonian liber-
als and Jeffersonian civic republicans, between the Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists, between the committed democrats and those who were more
mistrustful of popular sovereignty, virtually all of the Framers-and indeed the
entire founding generation-shared a common background in the epistemology
of the Enlightenment. That epistemology was based on reason and empiricism,
specifically rejecting faith and revelation.
The Enlightenment-a twentieth-century word for a seventeenth- and eigh-
teenth-century phenomenon73-was made up of many different thinkers with
quite disparate political philosophies.74 Nevertheless, they shared a common
epistemology of rationalism and empiricism. In particular, they believed that the
methods of scientific understanding should replace "claims to knowledge based
on supernatural revelation, sheer authority, or abstruse speculation.", 75 For
Enlightenment thinkers, both the source of knowledge and its methods of
verification were human rather than divine.76
Historians generally agree that the American Framers understood themselves
to be participants in the European Enlightenment tradition and defined their
work as an elaboration and extension of that thought.7 7 One historian comments
that "[t]he formation of government under the Constitution ... was in a way a
climax of the Enlightenment.", 78 Despite the quite significant differences in their
political philosophies, then, the founding generation placed their faith in reason
rather than in revelation. Although this is not the place for an extended
historical demonstration of the Enlightenment views of eighteenth-century Ameri-
cans, their Enlightenment assumptions can be observed in everything from the
73. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, The Impact of the Enlightenment on American Constitutional Law, 4
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311 (1992).
74. See, e.g., PHILOSOPHERS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT (Peter Gilmour ed., 1989); DONALD H. MEYER,
THE DEMOCRATIC ENLIGHTENMENT (1976).
75. MEYER, supra note 74, at xiii; see also KETCHAM, supra note 15, at 21 ("[T]he Enlightenment
drew its strength from the repudiation of what it regarded as the millennium of superstition, other-
worldliness, mysticism, and dogma known as the Middle, or Dark, Ages, when Christianity reigned in
Europe, as doctrine, as institution, and as ritual.").
76. As one scholar has noted, for all their differences "there is a common thread running through
Enlightenment epistemologies": "a belief in the possibility of providing a rational justification of the
processes by which human beings arrive at theories of the world." Antony, supra note 7, at 199. For
general background on the Enlightenment supporting the broad statements in this paragraph, see
generally HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976); MEYER, supra note 74; PHILOSO-
PHERS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 74; KETCHAM, supra note 15.
77. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967);
HENRY S. COMMAGER, THE EMPIRE OF REASON: How EUROPE IMAGINED AND AMERICA REALIZED THE
ENLIGHTENMENT (1977); KETCHAM, supra note 15; MAY, supra note 76; FORREST McDONALD, NovUs
ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1989); MORTON G. WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1978); MORTON G. WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTrrTU-
TION (1987); GORDON S. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
78. KETCHAM, supra note 15, at 24; see also, MAy, supra note 76, at 88 (stating that American
Constitution was "both the culmination and the end of the Moderate English Enlightenment").
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debates in the Philadelphia Convention, 79 to the substance and structure of the
Constitution they produced, 80 to the debates over ratification 81 and the subse-
quent adoption of necessary amendments.82 It seems virtually undisputed among
79. See, e.g., Gouverneur Morris, July 2, 1787, JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 234 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) [hereinafter MADISON, NOTES] ("Reason tells
us we are but men: and we are not to expect any particular interference of Heaven in our favor.");
Gouverneur Morris, July 5, 1787, id. at 240 ("All that we can infer is that if the plan we recommend be
reasonable & right; all who have reasonable minds and sound intentions will embrace it .... ); Hugh
Williamson, June 28, 1787, id. at 204; (suggesting that "political truth [might] be grounded on
mathematical demonstration"); James Wilson, June 7, 1787, id. at 85 (using scientific analogy to
explain political theory); James Madison, June 8, 1787, id. at 89 (same); James Madison, July 5, 1787,
id. at 239 ("The Convention ought to pursue a plan which would bear the test of examination, and
which would be espoused & supported by the enlightened and impartial part of America."). See
generally William E. Nelson, Reason and Compromise in the Establishment of the Federal Constitu-
tion, 1787-1801, 44 Wm. & MARY Q. 458 (1987). There were even intra-Enlightenment debates
between rationalists and empiricists. Compare Gouverneur Morris, August 9, 1787, MADISON, NOTES,
supra at 421 ("[Wle should be governed as much by our reason, and as little by our feelings as
possible.") with John Dickinson, August 13, 1787, id. at 447 ("Experience must be our only guide.
Reason may mislead us.").
80. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Order,
89 Nw. U. L. REV. 347, 360-62 (1995); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The
Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 596 (1991) ("Consti-
tutional propriety for secular privilege is supported by the Constitution's Preamble-it is Liberty's
Blessings, not God's, that we are trying to secure 'to ourselves and our Posterity.' "); Nelson, supra
note 79; Andrew Reck, The Enlightenment in American Law I: The Constitution, 44 REv. METAPHYSICS
729, 747-48 (1991).
81. See, e.g., A (Maryland) Farmer, Essay No. 5, MARYLAND GAZETTE, Mar. 25, 1788, reprinted in 5
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 40 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST] ("I have been long since firmly persuaded, that there are no hidden sources of moral
agency beyond the reach of investigation [but] ... [rieligious and political prejudices ... are forever
arming the passions against the judgment."); Centinel, Letter No. 3, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Phila.),
Nov. 1787, reprinted in 2 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra at 158 ("All who are friends to liberty are
friends to reason."); A Revolution Effected by Good Sense and Deliberation, DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.),
Sept. 24, 1787, reprinted in I THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST
SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 13 (Library of America
ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE DEBATE] ("Let [the present epoch] be stiled the reign of reason."); Letter
from "The Federal Farmer" to "The Republican" (Nov. 8, 1787), reprinted in I THE DEBATE, supra at
248 ("[I]t is deliberate and thinking men, who must establish and secure governments .... ); Cato,
Letter No. 1, N.Y. J., Sept. 27, 1787, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE, supra at 32-33 ("Deliberate... on this
new national government with coolness; analize [sic] it with criticism ... [and] [b]eware of those who
wish to influence your passions."); Cato, 1 id. at 33 (promising future essays based on "reason and
truth"); Americanus (John Stevens, Jr.), Essay No. 1, DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.), Nov. 2, 1787, reprinted
in 1 THE DEBATE, supra at 229 (basing conclusions on "reason and experience"); Brutus, Letter No. 2,
N.Y J., Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 2 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra at 374 (noting that principle of
corruption is "so evidently founded in the reason and nature of things"); A Newport Man, Essay,
NEWPORT MERCURY, Mar. 1788, reprinted in 4 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra at 251 (defining and
relying on reason). See generally Nelson, supra note 79.
82. See, e.g., Rep. Elbridge Gerry, Debate in the House of Representatives (July 21, 1789), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 97,
102 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS] ("[L]et our means, like
our conclusions, be justified; let our constituents see, hear, and judge for themselves."); Rep. James
Jackson, Debate in the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra at 69, 89 (arguing that House should not proceed on the basis of "theoretical speculation" or
"ignis fatuus" (fool's fire)); Rep. Elbridge Gerry, Debate in the House of Representatives (June 8,
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historians that "the dominant, fresh, and creative intellectual energy behind the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights was that of the eighteenth-century Enlighten-
ment.
, 83
This straightforward historical analysis is clouded-but not totally ob-
scured-by our distance from the founding generation. The question of whether
to privilege faith or reason would not have occurred to the founders for the
simple reason that they did not see them as in conflict. They believed that
religious belief could be (and indeed should be) supported by principles of
reason.84 Jefferson was perhaps the most rigorous in subjecting religious beliefs
to the scrutiny of reason: in 1787, he advised his nephew to "[q]uestion with
boldness even the existence of a God; because, if there be one, he must more
approve of the homage of reason, than that of blindfolded fear." 85 There are,
however, indications that the founders in general-like most Enlightenment
thinkers-believed that any religious tenets that were contrary to reason should
be rejected. 86 Thus, the widespread American adherence to Christianity in the
eighteenth century does not undermine the conclusion that they relied primarily
on secular reason, contradictory as that may seem to us today. To suggest that
the founding generation subscribed to the epistemology of reason, then, should
be considered uncontroversial 87 and should incline us at least slightly in the
1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra at 69, 91 ("Let us deal fairly and candidly with our
constituents, and give the subject a full discussion."); Rep. Fisher Ames, Debate in the House of
Representatives (Aug. 19, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra at 132, 133 (arguing in favor
of what "experience has taught"); Rep. Thomas Hartley, Debate in The House of Representatives (Aug.
19, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra at 153, 154 (arguing against a provision protecting
right to instruct representatives because instructions "will rather express the prejudices of party, than
the dictates of reason and policy"); Rep. George Clymer, Debate in The House of Representatives
(Aug. 17, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra at 150, 151 (arguing against right of
instruction because it would turn Congress into "a passive machine instead of a deliberative body").
83. KETCHAM, supra note 15, at 25. One historian has explicitly extended this rejection of religious
irrationalism to its modem counterpart. After quoting a typical modem radical statement about the
individual and nonrational basis of truth, James Kloppenberg notes that "neither James Madison,
Abraham Lincoln, John Dewey, Frederick Douglass, W.E.B. DuBois, Martin Luther King, Jr., Judith
Sargent Murray, Harriet Beecher Stowe, nor Jane Addams would have endorsed" this view of truth.
James T. Kloppenberg, Review Essay, 13 LAW & HIST. REV. 393,410 (1995).
84. See, e.g., RUTH H. BLOCH, VISIONARY REPUBLIC: MILLENNIAL THEMES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT
1756-1800, at 194 (1985); KETCHAM, supra note 15, at 13; DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 125-26 (1986); WOOD, supra note 77, at 5; Ruth H. Bloch, Religion and Ideological
Change in the American Revolution, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD
TO THE 1980s, at 44, 51 (Mark A. Noll ed., 1990); Sanfoid Kessler, Locke's Influence on Jefferson's
"Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," 25 J. CHURCH & ST. 231 (1983); Harry S. Stout, Rhetoric
and Reality in the Early Republic: The Case of the Federalist Clergy, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN
POLITICS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE 1980s, supra at 62, 65; Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The
Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 896-901 (1995).
85. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 429, 431 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944).
86. See JOHN B. BURY, A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT 127-28 (1913); RICHARDS, supra note
84, at 92-93; Gedicks, Religious and Secular, supra note 38, at 125.
87. It is, of course, not entirely uncontroversial. Michael McConnell has suggested that at least the
religion clauses were inspired primarily by religious evangelists who did not accept the Enlightenment
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direction of embracing the Enlightenment as a guide to interpreting the Constitu-
tion.
B. THE CONSTITUTION IN CONTEXT
Another way to approach the broad question of epistemological context is to
ask what kind of polity the founders thought they were creating. An uncontrover-
sial answer is that they intended to create-and did create-a constitutional
democracy. But regardless of whether that democratic creation rested on a
liberal or civic republican vision, it is undergirded by reason. Virtually every
theory of the philosophy of the Constitution depends on a notion of public
deliberation, which in turn depends on the idea of public reason.
As I noted earlier, historians have been arguing for several decades about the
relative influences of civic republicanism and individualist liberalism on the
founding generation. 8 For our purposes, however, the differences between civic
republicanism and individualist liberalism are much less important than one
underlying similarity: like the Enlightenment tradition itself, both philosophies
give pride of place to the human capacity for reasoned deliberation, whether at
the individual or government level. One major difference between liberalism
and civic republicanism is what is to be reasoned about: civic republicans stress
that a deliberative citizenry should choose substantive values for the commu-
nity, while liberals remain skeptical of any values beyond those chosen by the
individual. But both traditions insist that reasoned deliberation is a vital part of
government.8 9
The liberal American emphasis on reasoned deliberation goes back at least to
epistemology common to both secularists and traditional religions. See Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1437-43
(1990). The weight of opinion seems to be that "[a]s a historian, McConnell is a fine lawyer." Mark
Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 127; see also Christopher
L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for
Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1272-73 (1994); Steven G. Gey, Why Is
Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment, 52 U. PrIr. L. REV. 75, 142-47 (1990); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right
of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 917 (1992); William P.
Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 357, 401-02 (1989-90); see also Tushnet, supra at 124; Ellis M. West, The Right to
Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America: The Case of Conscientious Objectors to Conscription,
10 J.L. & RELIGION 367, 372 (1993-94). But see GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN
AMERICA 121-23 (1987). The professional historians who have carefully examined the origins of the
religion clauses tend either to eschew this sort of problem solving altogether, see, e.g., THOMAS J.
CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 92-93 (1986), or to conclude that secularism was dominant. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); WILLIAM L. MILLER, THE FIRST
LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1986). But see MARK D. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND
THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965).
88. See supra note 72.
89. Cf. William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification,
30 GA. L. REV. 1 (1995) (stating that republicanism and liberalism share common goal of search
for-perhaps unattainable-truth).
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Locke and pervades the thought of the founding generation. 90 Even Madison,
the quintessential liberal who placed his trust in the complicated machinery he
set up to counter the dangers of interest groups, expected at least some parts of
government to be deliberative and to use reason as a counterweight to the
unthinking desires of the populace. 9' It is, moreover, difficult to imagine a
heterogeneous liberal democracy that does not rest on reasoned deliberation, as
the work of John Rawls has shown. Rawls-whether he is describing an ideal
society or simply the prerequisites of a functioning liberal democracy-insists
that policy formation 92 be based on what he calls "public reason": reasons that
are publicly accessible and that "all citizens can reasonably be expected to
endorse in the light of their common human reason." 93 Reason, in turn, is
defined as "presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in
common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not
controversial.", 94 Or, as Kent Greenawalt puts it, "a good liberal citizen should
not adopt a political position that is clearly irrational according to common
sense and scientific evidence.", 95 Similarly, Lawrence Solum defines public
reasons as "such basic tools of reasoning as logic and common sense, knowl-
edge of uncontroversial facts and those established by science, and values that
can be derived from the public political culture of society.", 96 Amy Gutmann
90. See, e.g., RICHARDS, supra note 84, at 127; WHITE, supra note 77, at 76.
91. See, e.g., James Madison, June 26, 1787, MADISON, NOTES, supra note 79, at 193 (purpose of
Senate is "to protect the people against the transient impression into which they themselves might be
led"); id. ("[The Constitution should reflect the wishes of a] people deliberating in a temperate
moment."); James Madison, June 5, 1787, MADISON, NOTES, supra note 79, at 68 (Senate should
appoint judges because they are "sufficiently stable and independent to follow their deliberate judg-
ments"); THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 348 (James Madison) (Edward G. Bourne ed., 1937) ("The
passions, therefore, not the reason, of the public would sit in judgment. But it is the reason, alone, of
the public, that ought to control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled and
regulated by the government.").
92. He is more certain that this limitation should apply to "questions of basic justice" than that it
should apply to all political questions. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 214 (1993).
93. Id. at 140; see also Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Moral Conflict and Political Consen-
sus, 101 ETHICS 64, 70 (1990) (stating that religious appeals cannot count as moral reasons because they
are not publicly accessible); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democ-
racy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2193
(1990) ("Especially in democratic political contexts, choices must be justified through publicly
articulable and acceptable reasons," not "undefended preferences.").
94. RAWLS, supra note 92, at 224.
95. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REv. 352, 382 (1985).
Greenawalt considers religion nonrational rather than irrational, and therefore finds religious reasons
acceptable in policy formation under certain circumstances. His distinction is peculiar, however, since
he would find a belief that gray cats are more sacred than other cats to be irrational rather than
nonrational. Id. at 402. I do not understand how a belief in the sacredness of gray cats is different from
a belief in the divinity of Jesus or the literal authority of the Bible. See John H. Garvey, A Comment on
Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1288, 1290-91 (1986).
96. Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1083, 1091 (1990). Solum argues,
nevertheless, that public debate ought to be "inclusionary" and open to religious as well as secular
reasons. Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 729, 748
(1993). He would exclude only "racist, sexist, and homophobic speech" from the public square. Id. at
752. Solum neither explains why such speech is any less worthy of inclusion than religious speech nor
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and Dennis Thompson suggest that "[i]t cannot constitute a moral reason to
appeal to an authority whose'dictates are closed to reasonable interpretation. ' 9
7
Thus, according to Rawls and the many liberal constitutionalists who follow
him, a liberal democracy, in order to meet its definitional requirements of
placing sovereignty in free and equal citizens, must base its policies on reasons
that are equally available to all citizens, whatever their underlying beliefs.
That eighteenth-century civic republicans valued reasoned deliberation hardly
needs discussion. Only reason could sustain the English-and later American-
republican claims of governmental violations of fundamental law. Thomas
Jefferson, the patron saint of republicanism and the man who succeeded in
temporarily resurrecting what many thought was a defeated ideology, devoted
his life to reason.98 It is not surprising that civic republicans emphasized reason:
Aristotle, from whom they drew their ultimate inspirations, also saw rationali-
ty-or practical reason-as a virtue in citizens.99 Again, it is difficult to
envision a civic republican polity-at least a polity with any diversity of
viewpoints-without an emphasis on reason. Certainly citizens cannot know
how and when to put aside their private interests in the name of the public
good-a core principle of civic republicanism-without appealing to a com-
monly shared perception of that public good. In a diverse society, no such
perception can develop without reasoned discourse.
The role of rational deliberation also runs through the modern neo-republican
literature, and is most prominent in the work of Cass Sunstein, Frank Michel-
man, and Bruce Ackerman.' 0 Public dialogue, as a prerequisite to "considered
judgment,"'Ol is seen as the only legitimate method of formulating government
policy. Public dialogue, of course, is only possible where the participants speak
the same language, and in political discourse, speaking the same language is
analogous to Rawls's "public reason."
Thus, as Edward Foley has pointed out, the Constitution embodies the
resolves the question of what to do about racist, sexist, or homophobic religious beliefs. Abner Greene,
who would exclude religious reasons from public debate and then compensate those excluded by giving
them exemptions from laws to which they have a religious objection, similarly fails to explain why
other excluded believers-such as racists-are not entitled to exemptions. See Abner S. Greene, The
Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1640 (1993).
97. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 93, at 70.
98. On Jefferson the republican, see generally LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION:
EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978); on Jefferson and reason, see generally NOBLE E. CUNNING-
HAM, JR., IN PURSUIT OF REASON: THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1987).
99. For further discussion, see Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented
Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329, 387-90
(1994).
100. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 197-98; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION
24 (1993); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 47 (1986);
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 45-48 (1985). See
generally Galston, supra note 99.
101. The particular phrase is Ackerman's, see ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 272, but the idea is
common to all the neo-republicans.
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"public reason" principle of John Rawls's Political Liberalism,102 whether the
Constitution is viewed as liberal, republican, or a bit of both. But history alone
is not a sufficient basis on which to interpret the Constitution, or to privilege
reason over faith. As Stephen Carter has noted, it is no answer to the claims of
believers to say that "we already had the Enlightenment, and their side lost." 
0 3
The founders' epistemology need not be ours. Thus, in order to make a
persuasive case in favor of Enlightenment reason, I turn now to some of the
implications of a regime of epistemological pluralism.
IV. THE SLEEP OF REASON
Critiques of rationality are not new. Indeed, intellectual history-to say
nothing of the history of the United States-is filled with Romantics and other
antiliberals who viewed the Enlightenment as a tragic mistake.'0 4 Twentieth-
century American religious traditionalists are not the first to believe that "secu-
lar humanism ... brings darkness and destruction on humanity." 105 Since the
Enlightenment, however, the burden of proof has generally fallen on those who
would deny the primacy of reason.' 0 6 Thus, Stephen Carter justifiably com-
plains that anyone who sincerely believes that the Book of Genesis provides a
better explanation of human origins than evolutionary theory, or that God can
heal diseases, is viewed as "stupid or fanatical,' 107 and as a "backward,
irrational, illiberal fanatic[]-not too smart and not too deserving of respect." 108
Scott Idleman criticizes articles with a secularist cast for "beginning with often
unstated conclusions about the intrinsic goodness of secular government."' 09
But if both religionists and radicals are confident that the Enlightenment was a
failure, it may be time to mount a defense. I do not intend to provide here an
abstract philosophical defense, but merely one grounded in practical reason.
What are the practical implications of accepting nonrational epistemologies as
equally valid alternatives to the epistemology of reason in the public forum?
In order to make even such a limited defense, however, I must first confront
102. Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 43 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 963, 963 (1993) (locating commitment to reason specifically in Establishment Clause); see
also Greene, supra note 96, at 1613.
103. CARTER, supra note 37, at 182.
104. See generally LOREN R. GRAHAM, BETWEEN SCIENCE AND VALUES (1981); GROSS & LEVrIr,
supra note 34; STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM (1993) (critiquing antiliberal
attacks on Enlightenment); LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL
IDEAL IN AMERICA (1964). The epistemological skepticism underlying social constructivism goes back
even further, to the Greek skeptics. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Reason in
Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 714, 739 (1994).
105. HOLMES, supra note 104, at 63.
106. See STOUT, supra note 44, at 150-51.
107. CARTER, supra note 37, at 25.
108. Id. at 159.
109. Scott C. Idleman, Ideology as Interpretation: A Reply to Professor Greene's Theory of the
Religion Clauses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 360.
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the broad epistemological challenge: that truth-or intellectual authority--does
not exist apart from the social and political hierarchies that create and sustain it.
If the most radical social constructivists are right, and there is no such thing as
truth or objectivity, defending the Enlightenment is like trying to collect water
in a sieve. Fortunately, it is not necessary to resolve this philosophical dispute in
order to proceed. First, the question I am addressing is not whether the
Enlightenment reliance on reason and empiricism is in fact the only epistemol-
ogy, but whether we ought to proceed as if it were, at least in the public arena.
Even if there are multiple and contradictory truths, some may be better suited
for public adoption than others. There is a difference between objective truth
and justified beliefs, and suggesting that only beliefs informed by reason are
justified does not take any stand on the existence or accessibility of objective
truth. I1 ° Further, neither reason nor truth need be transcendent or objective to
inform debate. As many scholars have recognized, postmodernism has not
prevented us from acting as if truth exists.l1 ' Indeed, we can probably do no
less: to act on the postmodern insights would be "like saying that, since
philosophers are still debating Descartes' epistemology, one need not take
notice of traffic signals in the meantime (since they might not really exist)." 112
Moreover, although it may be less relevant in "soft" disciplines like law, some
truth does exist: "If there were no facts, surgeons couldn't operate, buildings
would collapse, and airplanes wouldn't get off the ground." 113 Finally, as
William Marshall has pointed out, the search for truth remains an important
human enterprise even if objective truth does not exist, because "[t]he human
imagination is compelled not only by truth but also by the idea of truth."
' 114
Similarly, even if there is no epistemology unconnected to power relationships,
we tend to-and perhaps we must-behave as if there were. It remains only to
give that epistemology content.
A variant on this most radical social constructivist position is that there is less
difference between reason and the alternative epistemologies than meets the
eye. Reason can no more assuredly lead us to truth or consensus than can
faith.' 15 As philosopher Jeffrey Stout puts it, those skeptical of reason argue that
110. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 275 (1992); see also
STOUT, supra note 67, at 86.
111. See, e.g., Gedicks, Religious and Secular, supra note 38, at 135-36; Marshall, supra note 89, at
28.
112. Charles W. Collier, Intellectual Authority and Institutional Authority, 35 INQUIRY 145, 165
(1992).
113. CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEX, ART, AND AMERICAN CULTURE 231 (1992).
114. Marshall, supra note 89, at 30.
115. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 37, at 43; KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND
POLITICAL CHOICE 25 (1988); Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763 (1993); Robert Audi, Rationality and Religious Commitment, in FAITH, REASON
AND SKEPTICISM 50 (Marcus Mester ed., 1992); William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 843, 845-47 (1993); Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, 19
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 39-43 (1990); Tom Stacy, Reconciling Reason and Religion: On Dworkin and
Religious Freedom, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 55-56 (1994). For contrary views, see, e.g., Gedicks &
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"there's a leap of faith or ultimately subjective element at the bottom of
everybody's moral convictions." 116 This approach underestimates-and to some
extent jeopardizes' 1 7-the breadth of common ground shared by those with
apparently disparate moral views. For example, I imagine that even the most
ardent participants on both sides of the rancorous debates on abortion and
capital punishment agree that it is morally wrong to take the life of an innocent
person, and no amount of reasoning will convince them otherwise. (The disagree-
ments arise in how we ought to translate this moral principle into practice, but I
will suggest in a moment that such disagreements can in fact be the subjects of
reasoned discourse.) If we characterize this basic moral belief as a "leap of
faith" and then consider anything derived from it as ultimately nonrational, we
have essentially lost the ability to discuss law and policy.
Moreover, the skeptical approach adopts an overly cramped view of reason.
Reason need not be either sterile or abstract. Those who jump from the premise
that there are no absolute truths demonstrable by reason to the conclusion that
reason is therefore no help at all (or no more help than other epistemologies)
adopt the inaccurate view-common to such otherwise different thinkers as
Robert Bork and Stanley Fish-that "if not the heavens, then the abyss." 118
There is a middle ground. Owen Fiss has described what he calls substantive
rationality: "an intellectual process in which we deliberate about ends, about
what is just or fair or equal." " 9 Others have described a similar process as
pragmatism or practical reason. 120 Pragmatist moral reasoning need not be
foundationalist or purely inductive; it can draw on common experience and
observation, and it can tolerate some amount of uncertainty. Nevertheless, moral
reasoning, like legal reasoning, can be good or bad. It can contain inconsisten-
Hendrix, supra note 57, at 1603-04; Greene, supra note 96, at 1631; Mark Tushnet, Religion and
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 33 Loy. L. REv. 221, 240 (1987).
116. STOUT, supra note 67, at 14; see also id. at 13 (In the face of moral disagreement, "mustn't we
abandon the traditional conception of moral judgment and reasoning as either objective or rational?").
117. See id. at 44 ("The danger [of skepticism] may be that our notion of moral competence will
become so contested that we lose our ability to declare with confidence that Charles Manson (or a
two-year-old child) simply fails to judge rightly in cases where all competent moral observers agree.").
118. See Nussbaum, supra note 104, at 730; see also GRAHAM, supra note 104, at 382 (noting that
we now must live in middle range of science-value spectrum, recognizing erroneousness of value-free
conception of science so prevalent in previous generation, and equal erroneousness of countering view
that "all science is intrinsically value-laden"); STOUT, supra note 67, at 21 ("[T]here is a middle way
between false unity and sheer chaos.").
119. Owen M. Fiss, Response, YALE J. CRITICISM, Spring 1992, at 213, 216; see also Owen M. Fiss,
Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 789 (1990); Gey, supra note 87, at 175 (noting that
reason is not inevitably "sterile and bureaucratic").
120. See generally PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1992);
STOUT, supra note 67; Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First
Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 163; Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN.
L. REv. 1331 (1988); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787 (1989). It
is not coincidental that the quintessential American pragmatist, John Dewey, explicitly rejected the
epistemology of religion in favor of the scientific method. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH
37-40 (1934).
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cies and failures to notice logically necessary connections. 12 1 It can fit poorly
with experience or with one's other beliefs, or have unpalatable implications. 1
22
It can be based on faulty premises, unchallenged only because of cognitive
negligence. 123
Participants in a rational dialogue who appear to disagree about fundamental
matters can thus still proceed. Imagine a conversation about abortion:' 24 one
rational participant believes that a woman has a right to do what she will with
her own body, the other that the fetus is a human life from the moment of
conception. If one can determine that the prochoice participant supports such
laws as those against prostitution or drug use, or requiring the use of motorcycle
helmets or seat belts, one can perhaps persuade her that her moral reasoning on
abortion is inconsistent and its conclusion therefore invalid. Similarly, if the
prolife participant allows abortion in the case of rape or incest (but would not
kill a live-born child for either of those reasons), or rejects charges of child
neglect or endangerment for pregnant women who smoke, drink, or fail to take
prenatal vitamins, he might be persuaded to rethink the moral foundations of his
views. Once both these forms of reasoning are exposed as erroneous, the
participants can begin a less starkly differentiated dialogue about line-drawing
and the appropriate balance of needs and interests, much of which will depend
on verifiable facts (medical as well as social). The participants may still reach
an impasse, but it is much less likely because of their common commitment to
the rational process. 125
121. For an elaboration of how moral reasoning can fail, see JUDITH JARVIS THOMPSON, THE REALM
OF RIGHTS 24-29 (1990). See also DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 32 (1984) ("Moral
positions can be discredited if they are internally inconsistent.").
122. Coherence with other beliefs is part of the pragmatist vision of reason. See, e.g., LYONS, supra
note 121, at 35; Charles Larmore, Beyond Religion and Enlightenment, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 799,
812-13 (1993). Both coherence and adequate reasoning processes are necessary for us to deem a belief
rational. See Raz, supra note 110, at 279-81.
123. See Raz, supra note 110, at 279-80 (noting that in addition to coherence, "we also can expect
that a person should not be rash, or gullible, or prejudiced, or superstitious").
124. See Campos, supra note 17, at 1815:
Moral claims at least appear to be in some fundamental sense subjective. One cannot, given
the current epistemological obscurity of such claims, demonstrate that a woman's "right" to
procreative autonomy is superior to an embryo's "right" not to be aborted; in the end, all
such claims must have the flavor of arbitrary assertions.
See also Stacy, supra note 115, at 28-30 (suggesting that a religious, or "suprarational," view of
abortion leads to unresolvable conflicts). David A.J. Richards suggests that the apparent difficulty of
resolving abortion as a moral problem arises primarily from its novelty. Abortion is in a class of issues
"posed by new circumstances of our industrial and technologically advanced civilization," but contin-
ued exposure and evolution may well make the moral questions more determinate and less inchoate.
David A.J. Richards, Book Review, 23 GA. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (1989). Jeffrey Stout agrees, pointing
out that the morality of abortion is more like "disagreement among cosmologists over the origin of the
universe" than it is like agreement on the propositions taught in Physics 101: "It's not yet clear what, if
anything, is going to settle these disagreements, although neither one seems impossible in principle to
resolve by rational means." STOUT, supra note 67, at 42.
125. See THOMPSON, supra note 12 1, at 27-29. For other examples of how morality can be discussed
rationally, see RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 221-23 (1992); STOUT, supra note 67, at 94-95.
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If religion is injected into the discussion, however, the likelihood of impasse
rises considerably. Sincerely held religious beliefs cannot be shaken by rational
argument-that is the heart of faith. Because God's commands need not be
rational, logical, or consistent, the response that abortion is contrary to God's
will is essentially a conversation stopper. As Judith Jarvis Thompson points out:
"Anyone who can say of a batch of fertilized eggs 'Those are children', and
believe it to be a literal truth, must surely be immune to argument." 126 If one
does not share the underlying faith, one is reduced to arguing about whether the
believer has properly interpreted God's commands. That is a sterile argument
indeed-focusing on authority rather than morality-and one which is particu-
larly unlikely to succeed in the context of any religion that denies individual
believers the right to dissent from authorized interpretations. Similarly, the
radical appeal to emotion cannot be challenged: the only response to the claim
that being "a woman of color" "influences [one participant's] view on abor-
tion" 1 27 is that being something other than a woman of color-or even being a
woman of color with experiences that might differ from those of the first
participant-influences the view of the other participant. Just as a failure to
convert limits the responses one can make to a statement of faith, emotive
appeals may "function as an authoritarian conversation-ending move." 128 Rea-
son, then, need not be Cartesian to differentiate itself from other epistemologies:
it is possible to converse reasonably without either following a rigid logical
sequence or reaching a defined answer, but reason, unlike some other epistemolo-
gies, rules certain conversational moves out of order.
The question thus comes down to whether we ought to privilege reason and
empiricism over alternative ways of knowing. What, if anything, is wrong with
a kind of epistemological pluralism that allows the different ways of knowing to
coexist even in the public sphere? I suggest that there are major difficulties with
epistemological pluralism. I want to make clear at the outset that I am specifi-
cally talking about the public arena. Alternative epistemologies-especially
religious ones-may satisfy deep human needs, and for that reason alone should
be tolerated as individual beliefs.12 9 A problem arises only When those alterna-
tive epistemologies demand public recognition, support, or influence-in other
words, when we are asked to subordinate reason to another, nonrational,
epistemology in making public policy. In one sense, then, I am arguing for a
scheme analogous to what one scholar has characterized as the eighteenth-
century "schizophrenic conception of God": the rational "Divine Engineer" in
public, and the warmer, more mystical "Heavenly Father" for "personal reli-
126. THOMPSON, supra note 121, at 293.
127. Johnson, supra note 29, at 819.
128. Gerald Torres, Re-Understanding the Voices Debate: Culture, Pluralism, and Law, Thomas
Distinguished Lecture at the Yale Law School (Apr. 3, 1990), quoted in Farber & Sherry, supra note 34,
at 829 n.120.
129. See Marshall, supra note 115, at 843, 861-63.
[Vol. 84:453
HeinOnline  -- 84 Geo. L.J. 476 1995-1996
THE SLEEP OF REASON
gious experience." ' 30 Thus, I am directly taking issue with Stephen Carter's
complaint that the law treats religion as a hobby.' 3 1 Similarly, I disagree with
scholars such as Mary Coombs and Kathryn Abrams, who imply that legal
scholarship relying on individual emotive appeals is no less scholarly than that
relying on empiricism and rational argument. 1
32
The primary problem with epistemological pluralism is that there is no way
to resolve disputes between epistemologies except by recourse to power. In this,
a regime of epistemological pluralism resembles the hostile religious pluralism-
and religious warfare-that prevailed before the Enlightenment. The Enlighten-
ment was in one sense a response to the absence of epistemological authority:
"Incompatible appeals to authority seemed equally reasonable, and therefore
equally suspect, as well as thoroughly useless as vehicles of rational persua-
sion."' 133 Similarly, in the absence of an agreed epistemology, we cannot
mediate between religious traditionalists and radical feminists; whether the
traditional nuclear family is mandated or outlawed will depend on who has the
most votes.134 Indeed, despite their common epistemological claims, the radi-
cals and the religionists are often in opposition to one another. Linda Hirshman,
for example, claims that the recent religious revival is motivated by racism and
sexism.' 35 She is not alone; Frederick Gedicks notes that many postmodernists
are as suspicious of religion as they are of reason. 136 Similarly, the established
religions that rely most heavily on revelation, biblical literalism, and other
nonrational forms of knowledge are often least willing to tolerate-much less
endorse-the feminist and gay rights agendas urged by the radicals. At least
some academic defenders of religious epistemologies simultaneously condemn
the alternative epistemologies of radical feminists and critical race theorists.
13 7
130. See TURNER, supra note 6, at 59.
131. See Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987
DuKE L.J. 977, 992-96.
132. See Coombs, supra note 35, at 714-15 & n.125; Abrams, supra note 23, at 1041-45, 1048-51
(discussing validity of feminist narrative scholarship); see also Johnson, supra note 29 (discussing
validity of narrative and critical race theory scholarship).
133. STouT, supra note 44, at 235.
134. For a stark example of the conflict between these two nonrational epistemologies, see Smolin,
supra note 51, at 1094-95.
135. See Hirshman, supra note 50, at 1864-65.
136. See Gedicks, Religious and Secular, supra note 38, at 135; see also Michael W. McConnell,
"God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of Religion in the Post-modem Age, 1993 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 163, 188 (criticizing Tushnet for his failure, as a postmodernist, to escape the liberal view of
religion).
137. Compare Alexander, supra note 115, at 774-75 (denying existence of any "epistemological
divide" between reason and religion) with Larry Alexander, What We Do, and Why We Do It, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 1885, 1890-96 (1993) (criticizing recent feminist and critical race theory scholarship for
"fail[ing] the test for rational discourse"); compare CARTER, supra note 37 (advocating religious
epistemological pluralism) with Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and "White Male" Standards:
Some Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065 (1991) (suggesting that different cultural
groups ought to be held to same academic standards because there are no significant epistemological
differences between them).
There are exceptions on both sides. Some of the best scholars in both fields have noticed the affinity
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Only the common language of reason allows us to persuade one another and
perhaps to conclude that in some areas-such as family structure and private
worship-individuals ought to be permitted to make their own choices.
Many of those who argue for epistemological pluralism implicitly recognize
that public appeals must take a rational form, since their own arguments rely on
reason rather than on revelation. Indeed, it is hard to see how epistemological
pluralism can be supported except through appeals to reason. Social constructiv-
ists are subject to the obvious criticism that their arguments for epistemological
pluralism are also socially constructed and thus necessarily a matter of power
relations; why, then, should we accept those arguments unless our own lack of
power forces us to?138 For religionists, whose truths are God-given and there-
fore necessarily superior to any human truths, granting any other epistemology
an equal status is a betrayal of God's omnipotence. Only reasoned argument,
grounded in common experience about human needs and the best ways to
satisfy them, can yield a conclusion that individualized epistemologies should
be tolerated or even welcomed. Moreover, unless we would agree with the
medical student who refused to reject even a schizophrenic epistemology as
deviant, we also need a way to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable
epistemologies. Again, only empiricism and reasoned argument-about scien-
tific likelihoods, about human happiness and suffering, about the adaptive
usefulness of various beliefs--can allow us to draw such distinctions.
Some, however, have suggested that the historical era of the Enlightenment
was unique, and that epistemological pluralism would, in the modem world,
create little danger of internecine warfare. 13 9 This optimism overlooks one of
the fundamental differences between rational and antirational epistemologies:
and occasionally called for each side to welcome and tolerate the other. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note
37, at 180 ("The demand for the teaching of scientific creationism.., is much like the demand for what
is described as a multicultural curriculum."); Gedicks, Religious and Secular, supra note 38, at 113
(stating that both religion and radicals question claims of Enlightenment reason and empiricism);
Levinson, supra note 32, at 2062 (equating claims of exclusion from liberal hegemony made by
religious believers, feminists, and critical race theorists); Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on
Multiculturalism, "Equal Concern and Respect," and the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 989, 995, 1005 (1993) (equating religious pluralism with multiculturalism);
Lupu, supra note 80, at 584-85 (noting similarities between debates over creationism and Afrocentric
curricula); McConnell, supra note 66, at 150-51 (suggesting that we should be as tolerant of particular-
ist multiculturalism as we have been of religious pluralism); Michael W. McConnell, Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 134-35 (1992) (noting that secular liberalism is under
attack from both the left and right); Smolin, supra note 51, at 1073 (noting similar attacks on liberalism
by evangelicals and radical legal scholars); Stolzenberg, supra note 36, at 664-66; Ruti Teitel,
Postmodernist Architectures in the Law of Religion, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 99.
138. Cf Alan R. Madry, Analytic Deconstructionism? The Intellectual Voyeurism ofAnthony D'Amato,
63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1033, 1036 (1995) ("[Postmodernism] precludes any reasoned argument for
change. After all, if there is no such thing as justice or righteousness, then the present arrangement is no
worse than any alternative; 'worse' presupposes a standard.").
139. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Political Choice: Further Thoughts-And
Second Thoughts-On Love and Power, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 703, 714-15 (1993); Maimon Schwarzs-
child, Religion and Public Debate in a Liberal Society: Always Oil and Water or Sometimes More Like
Rum and Coca-Cola?, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 903, 914 (1993).
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because the latter rest on faith rather than reason, they are likely to be impervi-
ous to persuasion and resistant to compromise.14 0 Moreover, without the skepti-
cal cast of mind fostered by Enlightenment epistemology, antirational
epistemologies-especially religion, with its extrahuman source of authority-
are likely to be conducive to particularly deep conviction. Deep conviction, in
turn, is a breeding ground for exactly the religious wars of previous centuries:
In Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes argued that a logical result of deep
conviction is intolerance. As Dean Bollinger has added, failing to attempt to
silence what one believes to be false might be seen as a sign of weak
conviction.... To the zealous adherent, intolerance and persecution become,
in a sense, the measure of her commitment to her religious beliefs. 141
Even in the United States, where religion has largely been domesticated (as
Michael Perry puts it), 142 we have not been spared all of the violence associated
with pre-Enlightenment religious wars. Although, as Perry points out, "[w]e are
not the former Yugoslavia or India," 143 the Branch Davidians, the World Trade
Center bombers, the abortion clinic killings, and the growth of various organiza-
tions-on the left and the right, not all of them religious-that use irrational
arguments to reject and resist the authority of government, by violence if
necessary, should give us pause before abandoning the fruits of the Enlighten-
ment. 44 Indeed, as one historian has pointed out:
If we have now entered an era in which those on the right have been joined
by some on the left in assailing reason as faulty because it does not corre-
spond to the essential and incontestable truths they have come to know
emotionally, or by virtue of their membership in particular groups, the pros-
pects for deliberative democracy are bleak indeed .... If truth resides in
difference and emotion, then war rather than persuasion is the only possible
consequence of speaking such a truth to power. 145
Even where violence is unlikely, the practical implications of epistemological
pluralism are not likely to please the pluralists. For example, Gertrude Himmel-
farb points out that different perspectives on history will inevitably conflict: "If
the feminist historian can and should write history from her perspective.. . why
should the black historian not do the same-even if such a history might
'marginalize' women? And why not the working-class historian, who might
marginalize both women and blacks?" 146 Currently popular antirationalisms
140. See Eisgruber, supra note 80, at 372-73.
141. Marshall, supra note 115, at 862 (footnotes omitted).
142. See Perry, supra note 139, at 715.
143. Id.
144. See STOUT; supra note 67, at 223; Eisgruber, supra note 80, at 373.
145. Kloppenberg, supra note 83, at 410.
146. GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ON LOOKING INTO THE ABYSS: UNTIMELY THOUGHTS ON CULTURE AND
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seem indeed to have little in common except their rejection of the Enlighten-
ment. Try to imagine a public school curriculum designed jointly by Bob and
Alice Mozert (the religious parents who objected to a standard public school
curriculum as secular humanism) 147 and Stanley Fish, Duncan Kennedy, or
William Eskridge. Find a single point of agreement-other than that the Enlight-
enment was a failure-between Michael McConnell and Catharine MacKinnon.
Even allies within the multiculturalist wing of epistemological pluralism are on
the brink of war: women are complaining about sexism within the NAACP, 148
federal laws requiring equality for women in college athletics are viewed as
hurting black male athletes, 149 and feminists are themselves divided over
whether to accord respect to non-Western cultures that practice female circumci-
sion, a mutilation of female genitalia. 1
50
The more radical of the social constructivists accept-and even embrace-
the inevitable consequence of their theory that there is no knowledge, just
power.151 Their project is to expose and alter the hidden power relations. A few
even remain epistemologically faithful by refusing to use reason in their scholar-
ship at all, relying instead on "narratives" to communicate what are necessarily
private and personal truths. Just as religious conversion cannot be prompted by
reason (pace Pascal), this use of narratives is a nonrational attempt to transform
beliefs. 152 But whether or not all epistemological pluralists explicitly recognize
that their position leaves power as the only means of resolving disputes, it is an
inevitable consequence of granting alternative epistemologies equal status.
None of the epistemological pluralists seem willing to confront the practical
SOCIETY 154 (1994). She concludes: "For that matter, why not the traditional dead-white-male (or even
live-white-male) historian, who might marginalize (who has, in fact, been accused of marginalizing) all
other species?" Id.
147. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (requiring public
school students to study basic reader series not unconstitutional burden under Free Exercise Clause),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
148. See Steven A. Holmes, In Fighting Racism, Is Sexism Ignored?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, § 4,
at 3.
149. See Nolan Zavoral, A Fight for Victories and Respect, MINN. MONTHLY, Oct. 1992, at 52, 53
(interviewing Clem Haskins, University of Minnesota men's basketball coach).
150. See, e.g., Karen Engle, Female Subjects of Public International Law: Human Rights and the
Exotic Other Female, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1509 (1992) (discussing approaches within women's rights
literature to issue of genital mutilation, concluding no approach "actively engages" women within
cultures practicing genital mutilation); Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and
Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189,
191 (1992) (advocating "multicultural dialogue and a shared search for areas of overlap, shared
concerns and values" in dealing with "culturally challenging practices" such as female genital
mutilation); Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital Mutilation ": Feminist Human Rights
Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1995); Bronwyn Winter, Women, the Law,
and Cultural Relativism in France: The Case of Excision, 19 SIGNS 939, 960-66 (1994) (describing
French feminist camp as divided between "protrial feminists," who favor criminalization of genital
mutilation, and "cultural relativists," who reject criminalization as ethnocentric).
151. See Chantal Mouffe, Democracy and Pluralism: A Critique of the Rationalist Approach, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 1533 (1995); see also GROSS & LEVITT, supra note 34, at 72 (stating that on the
radical constructivist view, "all knowledge projects are, like war, politics by other means").
152. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 33.
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implications of this reduction of knowledge to power. 53 Stephen Carter, for
example, notes that the problem with creationism is not its epistemological
pedigree but that, like the proposition that the earth is flat, it is "factually in
error." 154 According to both religious and radical social constructivists, how-
ever, one cannot make the claim that any proposition is "factually in error"
except from within a particular epistemological system. Thus, an epistemologi-
cal pluralist like Carter should not be making such a statement at all, since he
maintains that the rationalism and empiricism on which such "factual" claims
are based are no more valid than an epistemology of faith and revelation that
might lead to opposite conclusions. Similarly, many of the religious epistemologi-
cal pluralists castigate Justice Scalia's opinion in Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Smith.' 5 5 But Scalia's position instantiates the
notion that only power can mediate between different epistemological systems:
he is comfortable in "leaving accommodation to the political process" even
though that will "place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that
are not widely engaged in." 156 The radical cris de coeur pleading for progres-
sive changes in the law are similarly unpersuasive in the face of the current
stolid conservatism of the American people: unless moved emotionally by the
academic appeals-an unlikely scenario-there is no reason for either citizens
or politicians to change their views. "For if ideas are mere reflections of the
exercise of power, it becomes difficult to find a basis for criticizing social
arrangements."' 15 7 And if reason is not a universal epistemology that can
mediate between the different beliefs, but only the belief system favored by the
powerful, then whoever is in power will reify his own epistemology. That is the
nature of the social constructivist critique.
One rather prosaic example may illustrate, close to home, the dangers of
abandoning epistemological objectivity in favor of structures of power. Most
academic journals use a blind reviewing system, in order to minimize institu-
tional authority and maximize intellectual authority. They rely, in other words,
as much as possible on objective standards rather than on hierarchies of power
within academia. 158 Law reviews are an exception; those who select articles are
fully aware of the identity, past scholarly achievements, and institutional affilia-
153. For a similar charge, see PETER DEWS, LOGicS OF DISINTEGRATION: POST-STRUCTURALIST
THOUGHT AND THE CLAIMS OF CRITICAL THEORY at xv, 230 (1987) (claiming that postmodemist
followers of Foucault have not recognized social constructivism's potential for totalitarianism).
154. CARTER, supra note 37, at 161-62.
155. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For criticism, see, e.g., Laycock, Remnants, supra note 55; McConnell,
Revisionism, supra note 69.
156. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
157. Farber & Sherry, supra note 31, at 879.
158. They nevertheless do not always succeed in eliminating bias. See Rebecca M. Blank, The
Effects of Double-Blind versus Single-Blind Reviewing: Experimental Evidence .from the American
Economic Review, 81 Am. ECON. REV. 1041 (1991); Douglas P. Peters & Stephen J. Ceci, Peer-Review
Practices of Psychological Journals: The Fate of Published Articles, Submitted Again, 5 BEHAVIORAL
& BRAIN SCI. 187, 192-94 (1982) (suggesting authors' institutional affiliations and professional status
may bias peer review of articles submitted to psychological journals).
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tion of the authors who submit manuscripts. Because law reviews are therefore
able to rely more heavily on these indicia of institutional authority, they provide
us with a concrete example of the results when epistemological objectivity gives
way to power. Those results are not encouraging, especially to those who would
challenge the status quo. Unsurprisingly, prestigious law reviews disproportion-
ately publish well-known authors, authors at well-known institutions, and au-
thors at their own institutions. 159 If epistemological pluralists expect that
abandoning reason and empiricism will favor their political agendas over those
currently in favor, they are likely to be sorely disappointed.
The consequences of accepting epistemological pluralism go much deeper
than making some epistemological pluralists look inconsistent or undermining
attacks on the status quo, and are much more troubling than simply failing to
fulfill the expectations of its proponents. If we cannot confidently assert that the
earth is round or that evolution occurred, because those with a different episte-
mology present a counterargument that is valid in their world even if not in
ours, then the same must be true of other scientific or historical statements. It is
only the tools of the Enlightenment tradition that allow us to refute such
unsupported claims as that virtually all of what we now consider the accomplish-
ments of Western civilization was stolen from black Africans, 160 or that the
tragic bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building was the work of agents of
the United States government. It is only the acceptance of reason and empiri-
cism as the epistemological standard that allows us to reject such pseudo-
scientific theories, currently fashionable in some quarters, as that melanin is
"one of the strongest electromagnetic field forces in the universe" with the
power to make its possessors intellectually superior, 161 or that Jewish doctors
are injecting black babies with the AIDS virus. 162 Nor is it a defense that the
modern alternative epistemologies advocated by radical and religious scholars
do not always lead to such absurdity. 163 The point is that antirational epistemolo-
gies, unlike the principles of the Enlightenment, offer no weapons against a
variety of intellectual and political atrocities. As Marvin Frankel points out,
"[flor most of Judaism's 5700-plus years, ... the great Western religions
neither caused democracy to happen nor exhibited discomfort about its ab-
159. See Ira Mark Ellman, A Comparison of Law Faculty Production in Leading Law Reviews, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 681, 686 (1983).
160. See MARTIN BERNAL, BLACK ATHENA: THE AFROASIATIC ROOTS OF CLASSICAL CIVILIZATION
(1987); CHEIKH ANTA DioP, THE AFRICAN ORIGIN OF CIVILIZATION (Mercer Cook trans., 1974). For a
scathing critique of this theory, see Mary Lefkowitz, Not Out of Africa: The Origins of Greece and the
Illustrations of Nerocentrists, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1992, at 29.
161. See WILLIAM A. HENRY III, IN DEFENSE OF ELITISM 88 (1994) (quoting Dr. Patricia Newton, a
psychiatrist at Johns Hopkins).
162. See LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA 221-22 (1994) (describing favorable
reactions to 1988 statement by Chicago mayoral aide Steve Cokely); Arthur Hertzberg, Is Anti-Semitism
Dying Out?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 24, 1993, at 51-52 (describing prevalence of myth).
163. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 740 (1992); McConnell, supra note 66, at 26-28.
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sence."' 64Even today, the religious epistemologies that mandate discrimination
against gays and lesbians are indistinguishable from those in the not too distant
past that mandated discrimination against blacks. 165
And if the melanin or AIDS myths are not sufficiently silly or frightening,
there is a more horrific example of the beliefs that become acceptable when
reason and empiricism are demoted as socially constructed epistemologies.
Deborah Lipstadt notes that postmodem doctrines have allowed Holocaust
denial theories to flourish and to be treated as "the other side," another "point
of view," or a "different perspective":16 6
[The postmodern doctrines of Fish and Rorty] fostered an atmosphere in
which it became harder to say that an idea was beyond the pale of rational
thought. At its most radical it contended that there was no bedrock thing such
as experience.... [B]ecause deconstructionism argued that experience was
relative and nothing was fixed, it created an atmosphere of permissiveness
toward questioning the meaning of historical events and made it hard for its
proponents to assert that there was anything "off limits" for this skeptical
approach. '
67
Thus, those who deny that the Holocaust occurred are, in an epistemologically
plural world, as entitled to demand public recognition of their beliefs as are the
creationists, the Afrocentrists, and all the others who reject the epistemology of
the Enlightenment. They can demand-and many defenders of epistemological
pluralism, if not current case law, would support such demands from other
groups-that textbooks should reflect the existence and potential soundness of
denial theories; that if the public schools teach the Holocaust as a historical
event, they must also teach that it may not have happened; that if parents object
to their children being taught what they consider a historical fabrication, the
164. Marvin E. Frankel, Religion in Public Life: Reasons for Minimal Access, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 633, 637-38 (1992); see also POSNER, supra note 125, at 235-36 (examining crime rates and
religiosity, and concluding that "[t]he combination in the United States of an extraordinarily high crime
rate with an extraordinary degree of allegiance to Christian beliefs must make one question the
pacifying effects of Christian zeal"); Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 87, at 1265 ("But while religion
sponsors the highest forms of community, compassion, love, and sacrifice, one need only look around
the world, or probe our own history, to recognize that it also sponsors discord, hate, intolerance, and
violence.").
165. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967):
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on
separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no
cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for
the races to mix.
(quoting from 1959 opinion by Virginia trial court judge).
166. DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH AND
MEMORY 1-2 (1993).
167. Id. at 18. Although Rorty is sometimes considered a pragmatist, he is also more radical than
most pragmatists, and indeed his philosophy borders on social constructionism. See, e.g., Eskridge,
supra note 9, at 622-23.
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children should be excused from history class; that if a state university funds
student speech on historical topics generally it must also fund a group dedicated
to denying the Holocaust. Lipstadt sees Holocaust denial as "a threat to all
those who believe in the ultimate power of reason," 168 but the converse is also
true: the denial of the ultimate power of reason is a threat to those who would
keep the memory of the Holocaust alive.
CONCLUSION
The Enlightenment was indeed aptly named. From the darkness that hid
anti-Semitism and other forms of religious persecution, the denial of human
freedom for the sake of protecting orthodoxy, the inadvertent cruelty of a nature
that man could neither comprehend nor tame, and the deliberate unspeakable
tortures committed by one religious regime after another, the Enlightenment
burst forth and pointed us toward freedom and equality. We have not yet
attained either, but we should be cautious before jettisoning the worldview that
has brought us this far. The dangers that the epistemology of the Enlightenment
gradually defeated remain very real, ready to reappear as soon as reason sleeps.
Lest we fall prey to Goya's monsters, let us affirm that the Enlightenment
project is not, in either sense of the word, finished-neither completed nor
defeated.
168. LIPSTADT, supra note 166, at 20.
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